Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis
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Publication:1017085
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.002zbMath1201.91014OpenAlexW2086364787MaRDI QIDQ1017085
Publication date: 18 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.002
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