The evolution of cooperation through imitation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.007zbMath1168.91321OpenAlexW2101091128MaRDI QIDQ876884

Wolfgang Pesendorfer, David K. Levine

Publication date: 19 April 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/evoshort15.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationimitationevolutionary stable outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68)

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