Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
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Publication:1381991
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0563zbMath0892.90040OpenAlexW2059921720MaRDI QIDQ1381991
Publication date: 1 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/bandwagon.pdf
network externalitieslong-run equilibriumbandwagon gamesglobally pairwise risk-dominant technologystochastic evolutionary approach
Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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