Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
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Publication:2195697
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.04.003zbMATH Open1447.91022OpenAlexW3019514614MaRDI QIDQ2195697FDOQ2195697
Publication date: 27 August 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.003
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Evolutionary games (91A22) Miscellaneous topics in calculus of variations and optimal control (49N99)
Cites Work
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- How noise matters.
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
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- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Escaping Nash Inflation
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- Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
Cited In (9)
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries
- Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
- Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
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