Tributes to Bill Sandholm
DOI10.3934/jdg.2022009zbMath1505.91090OpenAlexW4285137343MaRDI QIDQ2106061
Dai Zusai, Ratul Lahkar, Ryoji Sawa, Man-Wah Cheung, Jia-Bin Wu
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022009
stochastic stabilityevolutionary game theoryrevision protocolspotential gamescultural evolutionprojection dynamicsWilliam (Bill) Sandholm
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Potential and congestion games (91A14)
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Cites Work
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