Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states
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Publication:2371155
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5819433 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1239549 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- Potential games with continuous player sets
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
Cited in
(10)- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
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- Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents
- Evolutionary game theory
- Sample path large deviations for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics in bilingual games
- Stochastic stability and disagreements between dynamics
- A combinatorial derivation of the PASEP stationary state
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