How noise matters.
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Publication:1408710
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00554-7zbMath1056.91011OpenAlexW2152171640MaRDI QIDQ1408710
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00554-7
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