Stochastic stability in best shot network games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001zbMath1241.91024MaRDI QIDQ423720

Paolo Pin, Leonardo Boncinelli

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

networks; Nash equilibrium; stochastic stability; ergodic state; best shot network games; individual perturbation process; regular perturbed Markovian chain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks, Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities, The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Evolutionary network games: equilibria from imitation and best response dynamics, Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game, The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences

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