Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

DOI10.2307/2171851zbMATH Open0862.90142OpenAlexW3123910378MaRDI QIDQ4895053FDOQ4895053

James Bergin, Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 8 January 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171851

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary modelssmall mutation rates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (87)

• Contagion and efficiency
• Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
• Local interactions under switching costs
• Anti-coordination and social interactions
• The value of a coordination game
• The evolution of cooperation through imitation
• Evolution with changing mutation rates
• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Log-linear dynamics and local potential
• Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
• Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
• Stochastic stability in best shot network games
• The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
• Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
• Social coordination with locally observable types
• Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
• Robust stochastic stability
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• Homeochaos: Dynamic stability of a symbiotic network with population dynamics and evolving mutation rates
• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
• Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
• A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
• Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
• Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
• Rapid evolution under inertia
• Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Information, interaction and memory
• Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
• How noise matters.
• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
• Changing the pace of evolution
• Mutation in autocatalytic reaction networks. An analysis based on perturbation theory
• Evolution, population growth, and history dependence
• Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
• Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
• Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning
• Unfolding social hierarchies
• Cooperation through imitation
• The evolution of exchange.
• Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation
• In defense of DEFECT.
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
• Local interaction on random graphs
• Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
• Economists' models of learning
• An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
• Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
• Competing conventions
• Stochastic stability on general state spaces
• An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
• Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
• The logit-response dynamics
• Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
• Random matching in adaptive dynamics
• RANDOM DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS IN ECONOMICS
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
• Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
• Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation
• Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
• Learning correlated equilibria in population games.
• Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations
• The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
• Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
• Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
• SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• Evolutionary network games: equilibria from imitation and best response dynamics
• Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise

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