Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
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Publication:4895053
DOI10.2307/2171851zbMATH Open0862.90142OpenAlexW3123910378MaRDI QIDQ4895053FDOQ4895053
James Bergin, Barton L. Lipman
Publication date: 8 January 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171851
Cited In (87)
- Contagion and efficiency
- Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Anti-coordination and social interactions
- The value of a coordination game
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
- Robust stochastic stability
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Homeochaos: Dynamic stability of a symbiotic network with population dynamics and evolving mutation rates
- Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
- The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
- Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Information, interaction and memory
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- How noise matters.
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
- Changing the pace of evolution
- Mutation in autocatalytic reaction networks. An analysis based on perturbation theory
- Evolution, population growth, and history dependence
- Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Multi-level evolution in population games
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning
- Unfolding social hierarchies
- Cooperation through imitation
- The evolution of exchange.
- Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation
- In defense of DEFECT.
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
- Local interaction on random graphs
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Economists' models of learning
- An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
- Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
- Competing conventions
- Stochastic stability on general state spaces
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
- The logit-response dynamics
- Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
- Random matching in adaptive dynamics
- RANDOM DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS IN ECONOMICS
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
- Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
- Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation
- Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
- Learning correlated equilibria in population games.
- Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Evolutionary learning in signalling games
- Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
- SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
- Evolutionary network games: equilibria from imitation and best response dynamics
- Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise
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