Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0227-6zbMath1133.91020OpenAlexW2053548478MaRDI QIDQ2472443

Jack Robles

Publication date: 22 February 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0227-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Robust stochastic stability

Cites Work

• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Evolving market structure: An ACE model of price dispersion and loyalty
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Conventional Contracts
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games

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