The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior

DOI10.1162/003355397555299zbMath0882.90025OpenAlexW2050673543MaRDI QIDQ4351429

Tore Ellingsen

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555299

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral bargainingevolutionary foundations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. ⋮ On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining. ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game ⋮ Does evolution solve the hold-up problem? ⋮ Stochastic stability in a double auction ⋮ Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm ⋮ Evolution and Kantian morality ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model ⋮ Better product quality may lead to lower product price

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