Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
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Publication:2044993
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105281zbMath1470.91067OpenAlexW3164083116MaRDI QIDQ2044993
Hans-Theo Normann, Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez
Publication date: 11 August 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105281
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