Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Game theory
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(11)- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- Evolution, investment, and bargaining
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Evolutionary game theory
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
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