Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2803zbMATH Open1018.91002OpenAlexW2035950711MaRDI QIDQ697929FDOQ697929

Authors: Thomas Tröger 

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/99584ba41a7b5501eb2931feb3d763dc921a71d0

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionNash demand gamesunk coats

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens

Cited In (11)

• Evolution, investment, and bargaining
• How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
• The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
• Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• Evolutionary game theory
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
• Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

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