Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1339738
DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1053zbMATH Open0811.90138OpenAlexW1497889210MaRDI QIDQ1339738FDOQ1339738
Authors: Larry Samuelson 
Publication date: 8 December 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1053
Recommendations
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cited In (49)
- Evolution, investment, and bargaining
- Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- The evolution of focal points
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma games
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
- Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Robust stochastic stability
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
- Network formation and social coordination
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
- Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- How noise matters.
- Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
- Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
- Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach
- Evolutionary game theory
- Evolution, population growth, and history dependence
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Unfolding social hierarchies
- On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models
- On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
- Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
- Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
This page was built for publication: Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1339738)
