Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
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Publication:1339738
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1053zbMath0811.90138OpenAlexW1497889210MaRDI QIDQ1339738
Publication date: 8 December 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1053
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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