Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games

DOI10.3934/JDG.2021015zbMATH Open1505.91086OpenAlexW3159143704MaRDI QIDQ2106070FDOQ2106070

Authors: Ryoji Sawa 

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021015

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zbMATH Keywords

large deviationstochastic stabilitydouble limitlarge population

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Large deviations (60F10) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Asymptotically Optimal Tests for Multinomial Distributions
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• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (11)

• Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
• Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
• Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
• Randomized matrix games in a finite population: effect of stochastic fluctuations in the payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
• Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
• Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
• Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
• Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
• The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games

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