Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1239549 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
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- Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
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- Sample path large deviations for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
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- Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
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Cited in
(11)- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
- Randomized matrix games in a finite population: effect of stochastic fluctuations in the payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
- Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
- The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
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