Evolution, population growth, and history dependence

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0575zbMath0892.90194OpenAlexW1990125308MaRDI QIDQ1381993

Ady Pauzner, William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0575

zbMATH Keywords

mutationsstochastic population growthevolutionary model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

On different aspects of portfolio optimization ⋮ Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation ⋮ Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information. ⋮ Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolution of social networks ⋮ Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games ⋮ Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise

Cites Work

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• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
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• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
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• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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