Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
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DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1039zbMATH Open0839.90140OpenAlexW2002196871MaRDI QIDQ1905946FDOQ1905946
Authors: Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson, Richard Vaughan 
Publication date: 23 June 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1039
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- Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
- Evolutionary games with two timescales
- Coordinated action in the electronic mail game
- Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
- Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
- Population genetics of gene function
- Evolutionary games under incompetence
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
- The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach
- Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play
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