Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
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Publication:1905946
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1039zbMath0839.90140OpenAlexW2002196871MaRDI QIDQ1905946
Richard Vaughan, Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore
Publication date: 23 June 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1039
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