Coordinated action in the electronic mail game

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0749zbMath1103.91322OpenAlexW1989957694MaRDI QIDQ5938619

Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0749

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcoordinated attack problemElectronic Mail Gameevolutionarily stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING ⋮ Communication, timing, and common learning ⋮ Efficient communication in the electronic mail game ⋮ Collective action as individual choice ⋮ Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication ⋮ Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Viscous population equilibria
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Operating systems. An advanced course
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

This page was built for publication: Coordinated action in the electronic mail game