Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games

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Publication:790722

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4zbMath0534.90095OpenAlexW2029677883MaRDI QIDQ790722

Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4




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