Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
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Publication:790722
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4zbMATH Open0534.90095OpenAlexW2029677883MaRDI QIDQ790722FDOQ790722
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4
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evolutionary stable strategysymmetric bimatrix gamebiological game modelsdirect ESSextensive two-person gameslimit ESSsequence of perturbed games
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Psychophysics and psychophysiology; perception (91E30) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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Cited In (57)
- Correlated equilibrium and evolutionary stability in 3-player rock-paper-scissors
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- Evolution of preferences in multiple populations
- To outsource or not: bike-share rebalancing strategies under the service quality deviation of a third party
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Anarchy, altruism and cooperation. A review
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Three steps ahead
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions
- Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies: The maximal pattern conjecture revisited
- Topics in the theory of ESS's
- Comparative statics of altruism and spite
- Evolutionary stability for two-stage hawk-dove games
- Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Rule rationality
- Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
- Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games
- Extended proper equilibrium
- When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
- The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies
- Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players
- Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
- The donation game with roles played between relatives
- An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
- Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Sex and evolutionary stability
- Evolutionarily stable sets
- Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
- Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
- Coordinated action in the electronic mail game
- Infanticide and infant defence by males -- modelling the conditions in primate multi-male groups
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Sequential methods for generating patterns of ESS's
- An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles
- Determining evolutionarily stable strategies in dynamic games
- On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
- On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
- Weak isomorphism of extensive games.
- Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
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