Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4zbMath0534.90095OpenAlexW2029677883MaRDI QIDQ790722
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4
evolutionary stable strategysymmetric bimatrix gamebiological game modelsdirect ESSextensive two-person gameslimit ESSsequence of perturbed games
Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Evolutionary games (91A22) Psychophysics and psychophysiology; perception (91E30)
Related Items (41)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- Non-cooperative games
- Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
- Game theory and evolution
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games