An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9035-5zbMath1206.91042OpenAlexW2143846971MaRDI QIDQ2461758

Axel Ockenfels, Friederike Mengel, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 21 November 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9035-5

zbMATH Keywords

trustevolutionary game theorymoral hazardeBayonline marketsreputation mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives

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