An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives

DOI10.1007/BF01243036zbMath0844.90119MaRDI QIDQ1905051

Güth, Werner

Publication date: 8 September 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stability; reciprocal behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A12: Cooperative games

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