An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
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Publication:1905051
DOI10.1007/BF01243036zbMath0844.90119OpenAlexW1992623025MaRDI QIDQ1905051
Publication date: 8 September 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243036
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- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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