Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
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Publication:2136939
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332zbMath1489.91105OpenAlexW4211203241MaRDI QIDQ2136939
Publication date: 16 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332
evolutionexpected utilitybargainingcumulative prospect theoryreference-dependent preferenceloss-aversionprobability-weighting
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