Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
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Publication:864894
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.005zbMath1155.91317OpenAlexW2153188212MaRDI QIDQ864894
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/16885
Related Items (7)
Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism
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- Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
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