Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution

DOI10.1007/S11238-017-9624-XzbMath1417.91245OpenAlexW2734370931MaRDI QIDQ1620914

Osamu Mori

Publication date: 14 November 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9624-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionaxiomatic characterizationsandwich axiomegalitarian Pareto optimalitystrong undominatedness by disagreement point

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Cites Work

• Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash's bargaining problem
• Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution
• Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
• Simple characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions
• An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution
• Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

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