Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution
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Publication:649130
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0497-YzbMATH Open1235.91070OpenAlexW2039332490MaRDI QIDQ649130FDOQ649130
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality
- Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations
- A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution
- Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- A generalization of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions
- No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution
- Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution
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