Choice functions and weak Nash axioms
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Publication:2318136
DOI10.1007/S10058-018-0215-2zbMATH Open1422.91230OpenAlexW2891021219WikidataQ129247539 ScholiaQ129247539MaRDI QIDQ2318136FDOQ2318136
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 13 August 2019
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0215-2
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