Choice functions and weak Nash axioms

DOI10.1007/S10058-018-0215-2MaRDI QIDQ2318136zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Susumu Cato

Publication date 13 August 2019

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0215-2

zbMATH Keywords

no-envychoice functionrational behaviorpath-independencemenu-dependent preferenceNash axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Internal Consistency of Choice
• Maximization and the Act of Choice
• No-envy and Arrow's conditions
• No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality
• On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
• On non-binary social choice
• On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Quasitransitive rationalization and the superset property
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Some formal models of grading principles
• The bargaining problem
• Weak path independence
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions

Cited in

(3)

• On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions
• Generalized Nash's choice
• An ethical interpretation of the Nash choice rule

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