A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
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Publication:1111447
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90130-5zbMath0657.90019OpenAlexW2009939740WikidataQ59973039 ScholiaQ59973039MaRDI QIDQ1111447
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90130-5
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