Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2362200)
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
- Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems
- Consistent extensions
- Distributive justice in taxation
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4195749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The kernel of a cooperative game
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2362200)
