The kernel of a cooperative game

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Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
Nucleolus computation for some structured TU games via graph theory and linear algebra
Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure
The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results
MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE
Coalition formation in games with externalities
Solution concepts of k-convex n-person games
The structure of the k-kernel for one composition of games
Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions
The prekernel of cooperative games with -excess
A lexicographical solution concept in an n-person cooperative fuzzy game
Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
An NTU value under complement reduced game
Michael Maschler's bibliography
Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the core of TU-games with a fixed player set
The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games
Bisection property of the kernel
Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus
The least square values and the Shapley value for cooperative TU games
Characterizations of the \(\mathbf{u}\)-prenucleolus by dually-\(\mathbf{u}\)-essential coalitions
The procedural egalitarian solution
Externalities, potential, value and consistency
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems
On a dynamic theory for the kernel of an \(n\)-person game
A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player
The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
Gately values of cooperative games
Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments
Reduced two-bound core games
On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities
The nucleolus in games with major and minor players
Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game
An extension of Peleg's inequality
On the nucleolus as a power index
Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
A union self-evaluation approach to associated consistency for cooperative games
Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
On the complexity of nucleolus computation for bipartite \(b\)-matching games
On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games
Self-covariant and consistent solutions of transferable utility cooperative games
Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
CONSISTENCY FOR PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS
SOME RESULTS ON (PRE)KERNEL CATCHERS AND THE COINCIDENCE OF THE KERNEL WITH PREKERNEL
A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
Continuity properties of solution concepts for cooperative games
Benefit sharing in holding situations
Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
Undominated nonnegative excesses and core extensions of transferable utility games
Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: a characterization without consistency
A consistent bargaining set
Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
The truncated core for games with upper bounds
Max-consistency, complement-consistency and the core of fuzzy games
Reduced game and constrained egalitarianism
Cost allocation for set covering: the happy nucleolus
The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets
Asymptotic stability and other properties of trajectories and transfer sequences leading to the bargaining sets
Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
Optimal deterrence of cooperation
Discriminatory von Neumann--Morgenstern solutions
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games
The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
-component additive games
A characterization of the nucleolus for convex games
Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
On the reduced game property and its converse
The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
Alternative reductions and axiomatizations of the unit-level-core
Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
Reduced games, consistency, and the core
The nucleolus of trees with revenues
Cooperative games with coalition structures
Cartels via the modiclus.
A strict partial order on payoff configurations and its some properties
Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
Antiduality in exact partition games
The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
Consistency of the Owen value for TU-games with coalition and graph structures
Stability and allocation in a three-player game
The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
Two-sided market situations with existing contracts
A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
Egoist's dilemma with interval data
Consistency and the core in games with externalities
Flow sharing and bankruptcy games
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

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