A consistent bargaining set

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0zbMATH Open0678.90105OpenAlexW1981827790MaRDI QIDQ1124543FDOQ1124543

Authors: Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta, Rajiv Vohra 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0

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zbMATH Keywords

corebargaining setcounterobjections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Convex games without side payments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution

Cited In (28)

• Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
• ON BARGAINING BASED POINT SOLUTION TO COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
• A model of agreements in strategic form games
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
• Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Regular population monotonic allocation schemes
• A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
• A bargaining set for roommate problems
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
• Solution concepts in bargaining
• Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• A limit result on bargaining sets
• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
• Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
• A non-weakly balanced game with non-empty bargaining set
• The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities
• Credible coalitions and the core

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