Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2005.12.002zbMATH Open1201.91058OpenAlexW2017852563MaRDI QIDQ855361FDOQ855361

Chun-Hsien Yeh

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

consistencysocial choice correspondencesminimal consistent extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Distributive justice in taxation
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Consistent extensions
• Voting by Committees
• A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
• Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
• A consistent bargaining set
• Consistency, replication invariance, and generalized Gini bargaining solutions
• Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems

Cited In (8)

• Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction

This page was built for publication: Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q855361)