scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533

Publication date: 1977

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Game Theory Rational Behavior Bargaining Equilibrium Social Behavior

Decision theory (91B06) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-01) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical psychology (91E99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05)

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