Voting
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Publication:5150300
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_584zbMath1458.91077MaRDI QIDQ5150300
Antonio Penta, Deniz Selman, Michela M. Tincani, Alvaro Sandroni, Jonathan Pogach
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_584
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; voting rules; welfare economics; Arrow's impossibility theorem; collective choice problem; political competition and strategic voting; political ignorance and Condorcet jury theorem
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