A group majority voting model of public good provision
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Publication:1091237
DOI10.1007/BF00450994zbMATH Open0622.90008OpenAlexW2041128281MaRDI QIDQ1091237FDOQ1091237
Authors: Rebecca B. Morton 
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00450994
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Cites Work
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- Existence of voting-market equilibria
- Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
- A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
- Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
- Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
Cited In (9)
- Voting
- The silent majority?
- Opting out of publicly provided services: a majority voting result
- On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
- Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution
- When do privatizations have popular support? A voting model
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
- Democratic public good provision
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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