Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution

DOI10.1007/BF00446985MaRDI QIDQ1120439zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors S. H. Smith

Publication date 1989

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00446985

zbMATH Keywords

economic approach toincome redistributionlegislative seatpoliticspressure group sizetax scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• Political geography and interest-group power
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Cites work

• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Correction to "On the Free Boundary of a Quasi-Variational Inequality Arising in a Problem of Quality Control"
• Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Non-cooperative games
• Pareto optimality in spatial voting models

Cited in

(1)

• Political geography and interest-group power

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