Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models

DOI10.1007/BF00297059MaRDI QIDQ800199zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. Ferejohn, Edward W. Packel, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date 1984

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00297059

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleexistence of a stationary distributionMarkov voting models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3168178 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3460142 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3195517 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3085434 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule

Cited in

(28)

• Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Generalized medians and a political center
• Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
• The finagle point is close to the yolk
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
• Policies over time and Pareto optimality
• Markov degree of the Birkhoff model
• A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
• On the uniqueness of the yolk
• Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
• Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
• Finessing a point: augmenting the core
• The Noisy Veto-Voter Model: A Recursive Distributional Equation on [0, 1]
• The relationship between the generalized median and minimax sets: a correction
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• Asymptotic properties of the paths in a specific voting model
• A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• A note on the finesse point

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