Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90413-5MaRDI QIDQ1121145zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Nicholas R. Miller

Publication date 1989

Published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90413-5

zbMATH Keywords

agenda controlpolitical economicsspatial voting gameyolk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Endogenous voting agendas
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk. A rejoinder

Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930664 (Why is no real title available?)
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Stability in Voting

Cited in

(6)

• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• The discussion of duopoly agenda control under asymmetric information
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues

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