Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
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Publication:800199
DOI10.1007/BF00297059zbMATH Open0549.90005OpenAlexW1977646512MaRDI QIDQ800199FDOQ800199
Authors: John A. Ferejohn, Edward W. Packel, Richard D. McKelvey 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00297059
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Cites Work
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- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
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- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
Cited In (28)
- The finagle point is close to the yolk
- Asymptotic properties of the paths in a specific voting model
- Markov degree of the Birkhoff model
- On the uniqueness of the yolk
- A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
- The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
- Policies over time and Pareto optimality
- Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
- Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
- Generalized medians and a political center
- The uncovered set in spatial voting games
- Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
- A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
- A note on the finesse point
- Finessing a point: augmenting the core
- A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- The relationship between the generalized median and minimax sets: a correction
- Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
- The Noisy Veto-Voter Model: A Recursive Distributional Equation on [0, 1]
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