Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
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Publication:800199
DOI10.1007/BF00297059zbMath0549.90005OpenAlexW1977646512MaRDI QIDQ800199
Edward W. Packel, John A. Ferejohn, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00297059
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