Dynamic legislative policy making
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Recommendations
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3259990 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3085434 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
- Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- Markov equilibria of stochastic games with complementarities
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- On stochastic games in economics
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
- Stationary Markov Equilibria
- Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players
- Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
- Stochastic processes of temporary equilibria
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- The dynamics of distributive politics
Cited in
(34)- Personal power dynamics in bargaining
- Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
- Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
- On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
- BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
- Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
- On dynamic compromise
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Sequential legislative lobbying
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
- Bargaining over the budget
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- The legislative calendar
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
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