Two-party competition with persistent policies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.014zbMath1297.91131MaRDI QIDQ403720

Jean Guillaume Forand

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibrium; dynamic electoral competition; policy convergence; policy persistence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91F10: History, political science

91A25: Dynamic games

Related Items

Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective, Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions, Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players, Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments, Representative voting games, Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

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