Two-party competition with persistent policies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.014zbMATH Open1297.91131OpenAlexW2065701946MaRDI QIDQ403720FDOQ403720

Authors: Jean Guillaume Forand 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.014

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zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumdynamic electoral competitionpolicy convergencepolicy persistence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Competence and ideology
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Political Motivations
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• On dynamic compromise
• On the benefits of party competition
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• On the Faustian dynamics of policy and political power
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives

Cited In (18)

• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective
• Policy persistence and drift in organizations
• Political payoffs and the electoral advantages of incumbency
• PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY AND THE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY OVER TIME*
• Policy inertia, election uncertainty, and incumbency disadvantage of political parties
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Representative voting games
• Policy experimentation with repeated elections
• Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
• Sorting in iterated incumbency contests
• Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules
• A dynamic theory of electoral competition
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• On the inconsistent behavior in voting for incumbents and for term limitation
• Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems

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