Representative voting games

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01283-XMaRDI QIDQ2235084zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Duggan, Jean Guillaume Forand

Publication date 20 October 2021

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01283-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• One dynamic problem in voting theory. II
• One dynamic problem in voting theory. I
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• Repeated Downsian electoral competition

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
• On N-person stochastic games by denumerable state space
• On the Faustian dynamics of policy and political power
• Two-party competition with persistent policies

Cited in

(5)

• One dynamic problem in voting theory. II
• Simple games with many effective voters
• On the Faustian dynamics of policy and political power
• Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

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