An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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(85)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Moderation of an ideological party
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
- Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
- Endogenous political competition and political accountability
- An example of the Peleg and Yaari economy
- A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
- A model of political parties
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Social insurance with representative democracy
- A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
- On the political economy of compulsory education
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
- Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution
- The political economy of early COVID-19 interventions in US states
- Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model
- Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political economy perspective
- A theory of decisive leadership
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
- Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)
- Representative voting games
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Ideological extremism and primaries
- Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature
- Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Citizen candidates under uncertainty
- Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning
- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
- Divergent platforms
- Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
- Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
- Whither political economy? Theories, facts and issues
- Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- A spatial theory of party formation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1102579 (Why is no real title available?)
- Lobbying and elections
- Distortion-free logrolling mechanism
- Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis
- Estimation and inference in regression discontinuity designs with asymmetric kernels
- Voting
- Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
- Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
- Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
- A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
- Power fluctuations and political economy
- LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
- Competition of politicians for wages and office
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Competition of politicians for wages and office
- BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
- Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
- Implementing direct democracy via representation
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
- Strategic flip-flopping in political competition
- How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence?
- Interest group information in elections
- Accountability in Markovian elections
- The public provision of goods in democracies: do age and inequality matter?
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Can the majority lose the election?
- Candidate stability and voting correspondences
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
- Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
- Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection
- The binary policy model
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