Recommendations
- Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
Cites work
- A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Approval voting: three examples
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226093 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Cited in
(7)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
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