The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
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Publication:2452148
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0597-3zbMATH Open1287.91048OpenAlexW3123452820MaRDI QIDQ2452148FDOQ2452148
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0597-3
Cites Work
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- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
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Cited In (6)
- How good is a two-party election game?
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
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