The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452148
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0597-3zbMath1287.91048OpenAlexW3123452820MaRDI QIDQ2452148
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0597-3
Related Items (5)
Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment ⋮ How good is a two-party election game? ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Cites Work
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
This page was built for publication: The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
