An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4351424
DOI10.1162/003355397555136zbMath0882.90001MaRDI QIDQ4351424
Publication date: 28 August 1997
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/73b8a3aef193dab6c2820ac9bfb2b7fd33f8f4fa
91B52: Special types of economic equilibria
91B12: Voting theory
91B18: Public goods
91B14: Social choice
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