Private polling in elections and voter welfare

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013zbMath1195.91028OpenAlexW2099040430MaRDI QIDQ840682

John Duggan, Francesco Squintani, Dan Bernhardt

Publication date: 14 September 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

electionspollingplatform divergencepolitical campaignsspending caps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ Public information and electoral bias ⋮ Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Pre-election polling and third party candidates ⋮ Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

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