Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00234zbMath1046.91036OpenAlexW3087980312MaRDI QIDQ4419354

Andrea Prat

Publication date: 13 August 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00234

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumsignalling gameinformation on the candidates' quality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (13)

Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters ⋮ Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS ⋮ Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities ⋮ On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence ⋮ Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection ⋮ Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections ⋮ Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ Civic duty and political advertising ⋮ Extreme donors and policy convergence ⋮ Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? ⋮ MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY ⋮ Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

This page was built for publication: Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare