Introduction to the symposium in political economy
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Cites work
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- A model of political parties
- A spatial theory of party formation
- All-Pay Contests
- Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Contest success functions
- Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- Lobbying and discretion
- On the benefits of party competition
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- When do simple policies win?
- When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
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