Introduction to the symposium in political economy

DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0690-6zbMath1280.00051OpenAlexW1997204941MaRDI QIDQ412082

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Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0690-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Collections of articles of miscellaneous specific interest (00B15) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
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• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• A model of political parties
• Contest success functions
• On the benefits of party competition
• All-Pay Contests
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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