Introduction to the symposium in political economy
DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0690-6zbMATH Open1280.00051OpenAlexW1997204941MaRDI QIDQ412082FDOQ412082
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Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0690-6
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Cites Work
- The all-pay auction with complete information
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- When do simple policies win?
- A spatial theory of party formation
- Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- Lobbying and discretion
- Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
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