Competition among institutions

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2212zbMATH Open0883.90002OpenAlexW2082529712MaRDI QIDQ1363368FDOQ1363368

Barry Nalebuff, Andrew Caplin

Publication date: 7 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2212

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zbMATH Keywords

group formationexistence of equilibriumformation of coalitionsrole of institutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Informational Equilibrium
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• Policy inferences from community choice models: A caution
• Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
• Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium
• Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility

Cited In (16)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties
• Partialising institutions
• Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions
• Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
• On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
• Sorting equilibrium in a multi-jurisdiction model
• University competition and transnational education: the choice of branch campus
• Endogenous party platforms: `stochastic' membership
• Endogenous formation of political parties
• Propaedeutics of strategic theories of economic integration
• Limiting dictatorial rules

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