Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market

DOI10.1016/0094-1190(79)90034-2MaRDI QIDQ4189012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susan Rose-Ackerman

Publication date 1979

Published in Journal of Urban Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(79)90034-2

zbMATH Keywords

Local GovernmentPolitical EconomicsTiebout-Type Governmental StructuresUrban Economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited in

(8)

• Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
• Some comments on majority rule equilibria in local public good economies
• Competition among institutions
• Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
• Solving endogeneity problems in multilevel estimation: an example using education production functions
• Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
• Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models
• Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?

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